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Abstract
This paper considers hidden teacher effort in educational production and
discusses the implications of multiple teacher effort dimensions on optimum
incentive contracts in a theoretical framework. The analysis of educational
production in a multitask framework is a new and unique contribution of
this paper to the economics of education. We first characterize the first-best
and second-best outcomes. The model is extended to address specific ques-
tions concerning teacher incentive schemes: We compare input- to output-
based accountability measures and study the implication of the level of ag-
gregation in performance measures. Against the background of the empir-
ical evidence on the effectiveness of teacher incentives, we argue that per-
formance measures should be as broad as possible. Further, we present the
optimum contract for motivated teachers. Finally, if education is produced
in teacher teams, we establish the conditions for optimum team-based and
individual incentives: The larger the spillover effects across teacher efforts
and the better the measurability of educational achievement, the stronger
the case for team-based incentives.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study optimum teacher incentive schemes. Teachers are often
motivated even without external incentives by having subjective preferences as
to the flourishing of their pupils. Hence, teacher incentives accounting for this
motivation do not primarily aim at increasing their effort but rather at aligning
it with the social preferences regarding the goals of education. This section ex-
plicitly takes into account multiple effort dimensions in order to illustrate effort
substitution which may render merit pay schemes degrading elements in educa-
tion rather than incentive providers.
There is a large body of literature on optimum incentive schemes, but a consid-
erable gap remains between purely theoretical considerations and empirical ev-
idence about the effectiveness of actual incentives in schools. While theoretical
models are usually positive about the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms, it is
empirically unclear which mechanisms work and why. This paper aims at filling
that gap by an interpretation of the empirical result on grounds of a firm theo-
retical model. In the context of teaching in multiple effort dimensions, we study
the opportunities and drawbacks of incentives in schools with consideration of
distorted performance measures, motivated agents, and team efforts.
Educational production is the process in which students acquire skills that make
up their educational achievement. It contains all dimensions of learning at school:
Students acquire not only technical but also social skills, which enhance their
productivity as well as their literacy and promote good citizenship. Educational
production is characterized by the following three attributes which distinguish it
from production in firms and show that the incentive problems in organizations
of the public sector are even aggravated in schools.
Multiple goals The goals of education include in no particular order
– imparting skills of literacy, reasoning and calculation;
– fostering the emotional growth of children;
– preparing students for work by teaching them vocational skills and attitudes
suitable for work;
– preparing them for life by teaching them skills of health and financial
management;
– preparing them for society by procuring ideals of citizenship and
responsibility.
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Given the limited resources of schools and teachers, these goals often compete
for attention and are therefore substitutes in the production process. However,
effort towards certain goals may also affect the achievement of other objectives;
e.g. social skills facilitate productive team work among students which itself
encourages the emergence of students’ appreciation for good citizenship. Our
model allows for different degrees of complementarity between various dimen-
sions of the goals of education, which vastly improves the relevance of the model
compared to the analysis of only one single dimension of education.
Multiple principals The education system has several collaborators who act as
principals in the agency relationship. These include
– parents and children;
– teachers;
– taxpayers;
– potential employers of the graduates;
– society as a whole.
The involved groups in education have diverse preferences and emphases about
the multiple goals of education.
Motivated agents Many people enter the teaching profession for idealistic rea-
sons because they enjoy working with children. Introducing incentive schemes
may therefore – besides incentivizing certain effort dimensions – destroy teacher’s
own motivation and have adverse effects on overall teaching. Hence, it is impor-
tant to note that optimum incentive schemes may not primarily increase teacher
efforts, but rather align them with superordinate goals of education.
We start by an overview of the literature on incentives in education in section 2.
Section 3 provides a model of educational production by first defining the first-
best outcome as a reference case, where the marginal cost of effort just equals
the marginal social benefit of the according dimension of education. Then, we
discuss the optimum teacher contract (and its limits) if there is only an aggregate
performance signal available, which comes from a measure of students’ achieve-
ment which gages a teacher’s output in education. Finally, the model is refined
and extended in four directions: (1) we consider accountability measures con-
cerning educational input, establishing an equivalence result and discussing the
conditions for teacher monitoring being the optimumpolicy; (2) we allow for dis-
aggregate performance measures which extends the space of feasible contracts;
(3) we examine the case of motivated teachers, analyzing the optimum response
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in the incentive contract; (4) we discuss an application of the model to teaching
in teams. Section 4 concludes.
In the main sections of the text, we argue mostly intuitively considering special
cases; the general formal model supporting the argument and proving the results
is provided in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
In our model, multitasking gives rise to distortion if there is only an aggregate
performancemeasure available – even if agents are risk neutral and not protected
by limited liability. The seminal contribution to the analysis of moral hazard in
multiple dimensions is due to Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991). They argue that
the principal distorts incentives when differences in measurement accuracy lead
her to induce the risk averse agent to focus more on some tasks than others. For
example, if the tasks are complements at the margin, it is optimal for the prin-
cipal to reduce the incentives for the task that is easy to measure compared to a
situation where the agent is engaged solely in this task. Baker (2002) provides
a framework for the analysis of the influence of distortion and risk in a perfor-
mance measure on their value and use in incentive contracts in an abstract pro-
duction setting. He argues that the more distorted and the riskier the measure,
the less valuable it will be and the less it will be used in an incentive contract.
Hence, principals usually face a trade-off between measures that are high risk
and low distortion or low risk and high distortion.
The literature discerns incentives systems in schools broadly into the two cate-
gories accountability and merit pay, where the establishment of an accountability
system is the first step towards the introduction of merit pay. By accountabilitywe
mean the establishment of some form of standards external to individual educa-
tional institutions and the use of tests to assure that teachers or entire schools are
doing their best to meet the standards.
The effectivity of monitoring alone in order to incentivize teachers is a contro-
versal issue: Ladd (1999) and Hanushek and Raymond (2004) find positive ef-
fects of accountability schemes in schools, while Kane and Staiger (2001), Koretz
(2002), and Jacob (2002) are critical, mostly because of the difficulty of designing
appropriate accountability measures. Also, the theoretical and empirical rela-
tionship between teacher pay and teaching quality is surprisingly controversial:
4
Hanushek (1994), Eberts, Hollenbeck, and Stone (2002), Lavy (2002, 2003, 2004),
and Ju¨rges, Richter, and Schneider (2004) are in favor of teacher merit pay, while
Hannaway (1996), Koretz (2002), and Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2003) find that
teacher incentives are very hard to implement, and that they tend to crowd out
preexisting motivation. Overall, it can be concluded that the concept of individ-
ual merit pay measures is theoretically very attractive, while in practice the em-
pirical evidence on its effectiveness is mixed. Potential problemswith individual
merit pay are: (1) that merit pay may interfere with schools’ efforts to promote
good teacher performance through pedagogical leadership, encouragement and
steps to improve teacher morale; and (2) that it tends to introduce an adversarial
atmosphere and create incentives to conceal problems.
A complement to individualmerit pay in order to circumvent the above-mentioned
problemsmay be the introduction of merit awards to whole schools. Ladd (1999)
studies the experiment with school-based awards in Dallas and finds mixed evi-
dence for a positive effect of such an incentive program on student performance.
Awards to whole schools avoidmany of the problems of individual merit pay, in-
cluding the damage to the institutional environment inside the school. However,
it introduces the problem of free riding among teachers if social control within a
school is weak.
The assumption of purely self-interested individuals may not be appropriate
when educational production is considered. In an experimental study, Fehr and
Schmidt (2004) find that with explicit monetary incentive, agents indeed concen-
trate on the tasks they are paid for, so that such incentives need not be optimal.
However, with non-binding bonus contracts, concerns for fairness, reciprocity or
inequity aversion may affect the principal’s bonus payment so that such a con-
tract which builds on trust Pareto dominates the piece-rate contract. In schools, it
seems reasonable that the interaction between teachers and students rests upon
reciprocity. In the relationship between teachers and an anonymous school au-
thority, which is discussed in the following, this aspect is surely less important.
3 The Model
3.1 Model Outline and Reference Case
The education process involves the sequence of events as displayed in figure 1.
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Figure 1
The sequence of decisions in
the education model.
1
2
3
Government sets teacher pay schedule, and class size;
Teacher chooses effort;
Nature resolves risk.
In the first stage, the government fixes its education policy which is fully char-
acterized by prescribed class size, teacher remuneration schedule and possibly
monitoring activities to learn about teacher effort. Subsequently, teachers decide
on their effort which is – together with class size – a determinant of their students’
success probability. In the third stage, nature resolves risk and the government
pays teachers according to their wage schedule.
We assume that there exists some aggregatemeasure h ofwhat a student has been
endowed with per time-unit of effective schooling. Some aspects of h can be well
assessed in tests, e.g. science skills, which are often referred to as hard skills. Other
aspects are much harder to evaluate, e.g. social skills and a other virtues such
as a student’s constructive attitude towards society, which are called soft skills.
There are n different skills which are produced by an according specific teacher
effort and contribute to educational achievement separably: h (e) = ∑ni=1 αiei.
1
Hence, a teacher’s performance translates directly to her students’ performance.
The marginal productivity αi can be interpreted as the marginal value society
assigns to skills in dimension i. We model educational production as a function
of class size m and a number of dimensions of teacher effort. The time during
which teaching is effective decreases in the number of students in a class, such
that student achievement is given by
P (m, e) = πmh = πm ∑
i
αiei. (1)
The parameter π denotes the probability that a student does not disturb class-
work during any moment in time; effective teaching takes place only if nobody
disrupts, which is the case in a fraction πm of time spent in class. Associated with
teacher efforts is a quadratic effort cost function of the form
C (e) =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
eicijej, (2)
1Bold variables denote vectors, e.g. e is an array of a number of one-dimensional ei.
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which allows various efforts to interact. We assume that efforts complement each
other such that existing effort in one dimension lowers the marginal cost of ex-
erting effort in an other dimension (cij < 0 ∀i 6= j):
∂C
∂ej
= ∑
i
eicij,
∂
∂ei
(
∂C
∂ej
)
= cij < 0.
Our measure of educational production P comprises soft and hard skills, which
in our model differ simply by their measurability via tests or school monitoring.
Of course, hard skills are also more easily observed on the labor market and are
thus more likely to be compensated. Soft skills often give rise to external effects:
They may reduce stealing, corruption and freeriding in teamwork or increase
political participation with important returns to society. Whether education is to
the students’ private benefit or beneficial to society is irrelevant in our model,
though: The school authority is assumed to maximize total social welfare, ir-
respective of where it accrues and with an arbitrary weighting of various skill
dimensions.
For the sake of a reference, we first assume that teacher effort in every dimension
is directly observable such that it can be contracted upon in order to achieve
the socially desired mix of skills – hence, there is no need to rely on a distorted
signal. We restrict the analysis in the main part of the paper to two dimensions
while the formal treatment in the appendix allows for an arbitrary number of
effort dimensions.
The first-best allocation under full information is characterized by the following
result.
Result 1 (a) Optimum class size increases in the probability that students behave well
but is independent of the other factors in educational production. (b) Optimum efforts
increase in marginal productivity and class size and decrease in marginal cost.
Proof. The result corresponds to equations (5) and (6) in the appendix.
In order to achieve the optimumoverall distortion in class, it must be the case that
better behaved students be taught in larger classes. Result 1b follows directly
from the first-order condition that marginal benefits equal marginal costs. In
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addition to result 1, total social welfare is stated in the appendix as reference
for allocations resulting from various incentive mechanisms under asymmetric
information.
Example 2 Consider the case of two effort dimensions with the simplification that effort
costs are independent across effort dimensions: c12 = c21 = 0. Education is produced
according to P (m, e1, e2) = π
m (α1e1 + α2e2) and the cost function per student writes
as 1mC (e1, e2) =
1
m
(
e21c11 + e
2
2c22
)
. Optimum efforts are found by solving W∗ =
max
m,e1,e2∈R+
{
P (m, e1, e2)−
1
mC (e1, e2)
}
. The first-order conditions (equating marginal
benefits and marginal costs) with respect to e1, e2 and m are
πmα1 =
2
m
e1c11,
πmα2 =
2
m
e2c22,
πm lnπ (α1e1 + α2e2) = −
1
m2
(
e21c11 + e
2
2c22
)
,
and solving for e1, e2 and m yields
e∗1 =
1
2
m∗πm
∗ α1
c11
,
e∗2 =
1
2
m∗πm
∗ α2
c22
,
m∗ = −
1
2 lnπ
.
Total welfare is given by
W∗ = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
α21
c11
+
α22
c22
)
,
where ǫ denotes Euler’s number. Note that since effort is assumed to be observable, there
is no need to draw on student performance tests by which various effort dimensions would
be better or worse assessable.
The basic model considers a situation in which teacher effort is not observable to
the school authority, but an aggregate signal representing student performance
is. By the term signalwe refer to an observable performance measure of a teacher
and her students. An aggregate signal is e.g. the overall score in a standardized
test, as in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). A disaggre-
gate signal is a more specific score, e.g. in a reading or math test.
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3.2 Basic Model With Unobservable Teacher Effort
If effort is not directly observable, there is a principal-agent relationship between
a school authority which intends to maximize the net surplus from education
as principal and teachers as agents who are interested in maximizing their net
benefit from teaching. The measurement of the students’ accomplishments in
different skill dimensions has to be based on a signal which is also produced in
the education process and which is – as opposed to actual performance – actually
measurable: S (m, e) = πm ∑i ai(ei + ε i). ai is the marginal productivity of effort
ei in the signal’s dimension i and ε i is the associated observation error. The vector
(ε1, . . . εn)
′ is distributed joint-normal Nn (0,Σ). The difference between αi and ai
and hence the distortion in the performancemeasure is due to the fact that activity
i affect the teacher’s objective differently from how it affects the performance
measure. There is also an error term ε i which contaminates the signal, accounting
for influences on test results which cannot be influenced by the teacher. We call
this the noise in the performance measure. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that the signal is homogeneous for students in the same class.
The school authority designs an optimum compensation schedule T(S(m, e)) =
b + tS(m, e) for teachers, where b is base salary and t denotes the slope of the
pay schedule (power of the incentive contract).2 Since unobservable effort is not
directly contractible upon, teachers maximize their own utility:
U(x) = −exp(−xr) (3)
with respect to their efforts, where their net benefit is x = T(S(m, e))− C(e) and
r denotes the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The optimum
effort choice is the incentive constraint (IC) to the authority’s welfare maximiza-
tion problem. In addition, there is a participation constraint (PC) guaranteeing
that teachers receive at least the utility level of their outside opportunity and
hence are willing to enter the profession. For simplicity, we assume the outside
opportunity to equal zero, but in the presence of free government funds it can
assume any value without fundamentally altering the results.3
2For the sake of simplicity, we follow the literature in restricting ourselves to linear contracts. A
fully flexible compensation scheme T(S) may not be feasible in Europe, where most teachers are civil
servants. However, many countries have recently introduced teacher evaluation systems with financial
incentives. In the Canton of Zu¨rich, Switzerland, such a system has been introduced in 1999 (Lohnwirk-
sames Qualifikations-System, LQS).
3In the case of costly government resources, the case is more involved, cf. Jaag (2005).
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With two effort dimensions, the linear form of the educational production func-
tion implies that society weighs both dimensions with α1 and α2, respectively.
The resulting optimum allocation of efforts could be matched by an appropri-
ate emphasis on various efforts, i.e. by compensating various performance di-
mensions differently. However, available performance measures may deviate
from actual performance. Consider an incentive program for school teachers
that uses student test scores as the performance measure. The true objective of
education be good citizenship and successful scientists. There are many things
that a teacher can do to achieve these objectives, some of which might also im-
prove according test scores. A teacher also can do things that will improve
the performance measure while having little effect on the true objectives of the
school system (teaching to the test). Knowing how teacher effort affects both actual
and measurable student performance via coefficient vector ff = (α1, . . . αn)
′ and
a = (a1, . . . an)
′, respectively, one can infer and compensate the actual teacher ef-
fort from test measures. Let e1 enhance the pupils’ soft skills while e2 is the effort
put into to teaching of hard skills. This situation is depicted in figure 2. In the
graph, a and ff indicate the relative signal strength and actual performance in
dimension 1 and 2 per unit of e1 and e2 respectively. Effort in the first dimension,
e1, greatly adds to productivity, but only little to the signal, while effort e2 adds
more to the signal than to actual productivity. Hence, performance pay based on
the signal without accounting for its bias distorts incentives. If actual productiv-
ity is orthogonal to the signals which are generated by the same efforts, the signal
contain no information, such that paying performance becomes futile. In figure
2, this would be the case if the angle θ between ff and a were equal to 90◦ .
Figure 2
Geometrical interpretation of the signal distortion in two
effort dimensions.
2
1
a
α
θ
Result 3 With only an aggregate performance measure (signal) available, the optimum
power of incentives decreases in the distortion and the noise in the performance measure
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as well as in the teacher’s degree of risk aversion; it increases in the probability students
behave well.
Proof. The results correspond to (13) in the appendix.
This result implies that in riskier environments, there should be lower powered
incentives in favor of larger base salaries because there is a trade-off of risk and
incentives. Prendergast (2000) argues that, in general, there is no such trade-off
in actual incentive contracts, observing that indeed much of the use of incentive
pay is in volatile industries. However, in a school setting, the trade-off is ap-
parent in the common use of well measurable science tests, while the students’
citizenship hardly enters a teacher’s pay schedule. When test scores do not co-
incide with society’s objectives, such performance measures will induce teachers
to engage in dysfunctional behavior which increases the performance measure
possibly without increasing the school’s real objective. This could result in a per-
formance measure uncorrelated with what the school system cares about.
Comparing the two welfare measures (7) and (14) in the appendix, we see that
asymmetric information clearly reduces welfare due to the distortion and the
noise of the performance measure, but also due to the teacher’s risk bearing.
The school authority maximizes total educational achievement minus its transfer
to the educator which consists of a base salary plus a signal-dependent perfor-
mance pay. The two conditions restricting the authority are the teacher’s partici-
pation constraint which guarantees that a teacher may leave the profession if she
has a better outside option and an incentive constraint which takes into account
that the teacher – given the contract – weighs her efforts optimally (from an in-
dividual point of view). The availability of only an aggregate signal does not
allow for effort-specific incentives. Hence, the school authority as the principal
faces the trade-off between excessively incentivizing science teaching and under-
weighing the procurement of social competence. If teachers are risk-averse, there
is an additional trade-off between insurance and efficiency: If teachers are held
fully liable for their students’ performance, they behave efficiently but bear all
the risk, if they are paid a flat salary, they are fully insured, but have no incentive
to exert the optimum amounts of effort.
Example 4 (1 cont.) We continue the example of the previous section, additionally as-
suming that signal distortions are independent across effort dimensions, such that the
off-diagonal entries in the covariance matrix Σ are equal to zero, σ12 = σ21 = 0. σ
2
1 and
11
σ22 denote the variance in the observation error in dimension 1 and 2 respectively. The ed-
ucation authority now maximizes the social net benefit of education as above, where now
the cost of the teacher’s per-student risk premium rt
2π2m
2m
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
)
adds to effort
costs:4
WSBA = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
P (m, e1, e2)−
1
m
C (e1, e2)−
rt2π2m
2m
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
)}
,
where e1, e2 are the efforts chosen by the teacher maximizes her benefit from teaching
minus effort costs, and who therefore solves
{e1, e2} ∈ arg max
{e˜1,e˜2}∈R2+
{
tπm (a1 e˜1 + a2 e˜2)−
(
e˜21c11 + e˜
2
2c22
)}
.
The first-order conditions equate marginal benefits and marginal costs:
tπma1 = 2e1c11,
tπma2 = 2e2c22.
Solving for e1, e2 yields
e1 =
t
2
πm
a1
c11
,
e2 =
t
2
πm
a2
c22
.
Substituting these values into the objective function yields the optimum slope of the in-
centive contract
tSBA = m
SB
A
α1a1
c11
+ α2a2c22
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
+ 2r
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
)
and optimum class size mSBA = m
∗ such that efforts write as
eSB1,A = e
∗
1
α1a1
c11
+ α2a2c22
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
+ 2r
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
) ,
eSB2,A = e
∗
2
α1a1
c11
+ α2a2c22
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
+ 2r
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
) .
4With exponential utility, as in (3), EU(x) = −
∫
exp(−rx) f (x)dx = −exp
(
−r
[
Ex− 0.5rσ2x
])
. Note
that expected utility is increasing in Ex − 0.5rσ2x, which means that we can take a monotonic transfor-
mation of expected utility and use the utility function U
(
Ex, σ2x
)
= Ex− 0.5rσ2x.
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Note that the power of the incentive contract depends on the noise and distortion of
both effort dimensions. Since only an aggregate signal is available, incentives cannot be
dimension-specific, such that the distortion is the same in both effort dimensions.
We can interpret the result as follows: Equilibrium second-best efforts are first-best if
the signal is not distorted (αi = ai, i ∈ {1, 2}) and the teacher is risk-neutral (r = 0)
or there is no risk
(
σ2i = 0
)
. They depart from the first-best allocation due to the cost
associated with the distortion of the signal if αi 6= ai and/or the cost of the teacher’s risk
premium if r 6= 0 or σ2i 6= 0. The signal distortion demands for an excessively high
power of the incentive contract, while a risk averse teacher needs to be compensated for
her risk-taking. Total welfare writes as
WSBA = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
α1a1
c11
+ α2a2c22
)2
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
+ 2r
(
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
) .
It decreases in the noise and the distortion of the performance measure and the teacher’s
risk aversion. If e.g. actual performance in one skill dimension is not measurable at all
(σ → ∞) teachers cannot be incentivized and total welfare drops to zero since a flat-
salary, which would be optimal in this case, does not incentivize the teacher at all. How-
ever, in reality, this will not happen, of course, since teachers are usually self-motivated
and maintain certain effort levels without according incentives (cf. section 3.5 below).
3.3 Input-based Signal
In the previous section, we have assumed that the teacher’s performance is mea-
sured via tests on students. These test measures were not only distorted, but also
affected by class size and the students’ behavior in class. Likewise, one could
also measure a teacher’s performance directly and possibly more efficiently be-
fore her interaction with students. This could be achieved by not testing stu-
dents, but visiting class and observing teaching directly. The relevant signal then
becomes S (m, e) = ∑i ai (ei + ε i) . The potential benefit of an input-based per-
formance measure comes from the direct avoidance of the class size terms in the
teacher’s utilitymaximization since she receives her pay irrespective of class size.
Principally, the compensation of her income risk can thus be smaller than with
an output-based signal.
Result 5 Measuring teacher performance directly at the input does not increase the
overall efficiency of the incentive contract.
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Proof. The result follows from a comparison of equations (14) and (15) in the
appendix.
An even stronger input-based performance measure is perfect teacher monitor-
ing such that the signal S(e) = a′e is available. This may be the case if there
are school inspectors who monitor class work closely or if teachers are urged to
account for their teaching by supplying extensive reports about their work to the
school authority. We assume that this is only possible at an additional monitoring
cost µC(e).5 While merit pay is a priori costless to society, since it consists of a
pure transfer from the government to teachers, monitoring appears to be socially
wasteful since it is not productive in any sense – other than its contribution to
uncover possibly hidden teacher effort. Hence, there seems to be a strong case in
favor of merit pay. However, practical experience shows that merit pay is very
rarely employed as teacher incentive program. This is in fact optimal in the case
that the cost of teacher information rent outweighs the cost associated with mon-
itoring. Consequentially, the school authority prefers monitoring over merit pay.
Result 6 The attractiveness of a-priori wasteful monitoring is the higher the lower its
cost, the higher the teacher’s degree of risk-aversion and the larger the variance in the
performance measure.
Proof. The result follows from (17) in the appendix.
This extension allows to understandwhy incentive contracts are rarely employed
in schools: There is a social cost attached to incentivize teachers, such that other
forms of stimulation may be more effective (cf. Jaag, 2005).
Example 7 (1 cont.) Compare the result in example 4 with the allocation which results
from the solution of the problem max
m,t∈R+
{
P (m, e1, e2)−
1
m (1+ µ)C (e1, e2)
}
where
e1 and e2 are chosen by the teacher according to her incentive contract. Total surplus
with monitoring is
WSBNL = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
α1a1
c11
+ α2a2c22
)2
(1+ µ)
(
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
) .
5The proportionality to effort cost is assumed for computational simplicity. It can be argued that the
first units of effort are easily observable in class, while higher efforts concern preparation work which is
far more difficult to observe. Hence, the assumption of progressive monitoring costs is plausible.
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Hence, direct teacher monitoring dominates the incentive contract iff
µ < 2r
a21σ
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2
a21
c11
+
a22
c22
.
3.4 Disaggregate Signal
The above-mentioned trade-off between overweighing one dimension and un-
derweighing the other can be avoided when disaggregated signals are specific
to each separate dimension. Since also the power of incentives can be chosen
dimension-specifically, there is no longer a distortion due to the multitasking na-
ture of educational production.
Result 8 If a disaggregate performance measure is available, optimum performance pay
emphasizes performance dimensions with low noise and distortion.
Proof. The result corresponds to equation (20) in the appendix.
Using disaggregate signals, total welfare can be substantially increased because
of the feasibility of dimension-specific fine-tuning of the power of incentives.
This explains why performance pay systems with differentiated measures, such
as in Dallas (cf. Ladd, 1999), work well while others based on only a few perfor-
mance dimensions fail due to effort substitution: With single-dimension effort
measures, incentives are either too weak or degrading, while disaggregate per-
formance measures allow for the optimum power in each dimension.
Example 9 (1 cont.) In the case that the two signals s1 and s2 are observable separately,
the power of incentives in the two dimensions can be adjusted accordingly. Hence, the
principal’s problemwrites as max
m,t∈R+
{
P (m, e1, e2)−
1
mC (e1, e2)−
rπ2m
2m
(
a21σ
2
1 t
2
1 + a
2
2σ
2
2 t
2
2
)}
where again e1 and e2 are chosen by the teacher according to her incentive contract. The
optimum power of incentives now depends on the properties of various effort dimensions:
tSB1,D =
mSBD
1+ 2rσ21 c11
α1
a1
,
tSB2,D =
mSBD
1+ 2rσ22 c22
α2
a2
.
The larger the variance in an effort dimension, the lower the optimum power of the ac-
cording incentive. Hence, optimum incentives are weaker in the teaching of soft skills
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than they are in hard skills. If ai < αi, i.e. if no signal is able to represent a student’s
full capability, the optimum incentive power is the larger, the more actual productivity
deviates from the signal.
The resulting equilibrium values of e1 and e2 are
eSB1,D = e
∗
1
1
1+ 2rσ21 c11
,
eSB2,D = e
∗
2
1
1+ 2rσ22 c22
,
which implies that in the absence of risk (or if the teacher is risk neutral), effort levels
are first-best even in the multitasking framework. Note that optimum efforts no longer
depend on the signal production parameters a1, a2: The distortion of the signal is fully
compensated by the appropriate power of the incentive contract. If teachers are risk-
averse, the downward distortion in an effort dimension is the larger, the larger the noise
in the according signal. In such a situation, the use of an aggregate signal leads to
additional inefficient effort contraction.
3.5 Teachers’ Own Motivation
So far, we have assumed that teachers are not motivated in the sense that they
derive no utility from successful students apart from their monetary remuner-
ation. It is most often the case, however, that teachers choose their profession
exactly for the reason of their motivation. Spear, Gould, and Lee (2000) present
evidence that a teaching career scores highly for undergraduates on the oppor-
tunities given for having creative input, benefiting society, and working with
individuals. The most common reasons are job satisfaction and working with
children. The reasons rated as least important included working hours, holidays,
salaries and security. It seems that prospective teachers are principally attracted
to the profession by the rewarding nature of the work involved, as opposed to
the pay or conditions on offer.
It is obvious that teacher motivation andmorale are of eminent importance in de-
termining students’ educational achievement. Studies analyzed by Spear, Gould,
and Lee (2000) reveal that teachers believe their own morale to be largely deter-
mined by their quality of life within the school, rating factors such as good rela-
tions with pupils and helping pupils to achieve as very important. When asked
to name those factors that they felt could have a positive effect on the morale of
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the profession as a whole, teachers’ responses largely relate to factors external to
the process of teaching itself, focusing on a more positive portrayal of the teach-
ing profession by the media, increased pay and conditions and less pressure. It
seems that to improve both the morale of individual teachers and the ethos of
the profession as a whole, a range of measures is needed, addressing both expe-
riences integral to the work of teaching, and factors linked to the structural and
social context within which that work is carried out.
The main factor found to contribute to the job satisfaction of teachers is work-
ing with children. Additional factors included developing warm, personal rela-
tionships with pupils, the intellectual challenge of teaching as well as autonomy
and independence. In contrast, teachers viewed job dissatisfaction as principally
contributed to by work overload, poor pay and perceptions of how teachers are
viewed by society.
To experience high job satisfaction, teachers need an intellectual challenge, their
autonomy, to feel that they are benefiting society, to enjoy good relations with
their colleagues and to spend a sufficient proportion of their time working with
children. Enhanced pay, improved status, a less demanding workload and fewer
administrative responsibilities should result in lower levels of job dissatisfaction
among teachers, but will not necessarily bring about higher levels of job satisfac-
tion.
We operationalize the concept of self-motivation by assuming that every teacher
l ∈ L (L being the set of all teachers) derives an additional private benefit from
teaching
Bl = π
m ∑
i
βl,iei,
where subscript i denotes various effort dimensions. Result 10 states the prop-
erties of optimum incentive contracts in the case that teachers derive a direct
personal benefit from teaching.
Result 10 If teachers are self-motivated,
(a) the optimum incentive contract substitutes self-motivation. This means that effort
dimensions in which a teacher has a high degree of self-motivation should be rewarded
less generously than dimensions with low self-motivation.
(b) the incentive contract simultaneously serves as tool to ensure self-selection of highly
motivated teachers into teaching contracts.
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Proof. The results correspond to equations (26) and (29)in the appendix.
Result 10b follows from the binding participation constraint. If a teacher derives
less self-motivation from her work than presumed by the school authority, her
participation constraint will not be satisfied. This result is in line with Lazear
(1999, 2000), who argues that variable pay is often used as a selection device,
rather than as an incentive.
Example 11 (1 cont.) We illustrate statement (a) of result 10 using the same framework
as above. The teacher is now assumed to derive a private benefit B = πm (β1e1 + β2e2)
from teaching (or her students’ success). Given the power of incentives, t1 and t2, her
optimum efforts therefore write as
e1 =
1
2
πm
t1a1 + β1
c11
,
e2 =
1
2
πm
t2a2 + β2
c22
.
This is taken into account for the design of the optimum contract which fulfills
t1a1 + β1 =
mα1 + β1
1+ 2rσ21 c11
,
t2a2 + β2 =
mα2 + β2
1+ 2rσ22 c22
.
Hence, as long as 2rσ2i cii > 0, the power of the incentive t in a certain dimension de-
creases in a teacher’s own motivation.
3.6 Educational Production in Teams
We have already addressed the possibility of team-based incentives before. In
this section, we explicitly take into account that several teachers are involved in
the educational process. For simplicity, we assume that each teacher in a team has
control over just one effort dimension.6 The creation of school-based incentives
is usually preferred to individual incentives since these are supposed to be more
conductive to cooperation among teachers (cf. Hanushek, 1996, and Craig and
Sheu, 1992). In order to encourage cooperation among teachers within schools
6This assumption is not critical: If a teacher affects student learning in several dimensions, these can
be subsumed under one common aggregate dimension.
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and to avoid creating incentives for teachers to sabotage each others’ effort, merit
pay may be based on the performance of all pupils in a school, with each subject
equally weighted, rather than on a teacher-by-teacher basis.7 We compare the
outcomes of two incentive schemes: One in which teachers are paid individually
and one in which teachers have a collective contract.
Individual Contracts If teachers are paid individually, they are assumed to be-
have egoistically and dispense with cooperation. In our model framework, this
amounts to letting potential gains of cooperation via the interaction of effort cost
cij lie idle. Hence, every teacher considers her own effort costs and ignores pos-
itive spillover effects on her colleagues. However, the advantage of individual
merit pay comes from the possibility of providing different effort dimensions
and hence different teachers with differently powered incentives.
Collective Contract If teachers are paid collectively, all incentive dimensions
must be equally powered, hence diverging from the optimum contract. On the
other hand, as a team, teachers cooperate and let others profit from positive
spillovers in the educational production process.
The decision whether or not to incentivize teachers individually or in teams de-
pends on the trade-off between effort cooperation and incentive tuning which
yields
Result 12 Individual incentives dominate collective merit pay if spillover effects are
small and if the signal distortion is large.
Proof. The result corresponds to equation (30) in the appendix.
Example 13 Large potential gains from cooperation among teachers should be realized
by paying teachers in teams in order to support teamwork. However, if test measures
strongly deviate from actual student performance, teachers are better paid individually
in order to profit from the possibility of specifically adjusting incentives in every single
dimension.
4 Conclusion
This paper has studied the properties of optimum incentive contracts in schools
with multiple effort dimensions. Our objective has been to identify the critical
7This is exactly how a program works which was conducted in western Kenya by the Dutch NGO
International Christelijk Steunfonds (cf. for its assessment Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer, 2003 ).
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characteristics of teachers and school institutions which determine the optimum
incentive structures and to identify possible reasons for the absence of incentives
contracts in schools. In particular, the model identifies the following distinct
forces that shape the optimum contract and determine its applicability in schools:
Distortion of the performance measure The larger the distortion of the perfor-
mance measure (given by the deviation of themeasure from actual performance),
the lower the optimum power of incentives.
Noise in the performance measure The noisier the performance measure, the
lower the optimum power of incentives. If teachers are risk-averse, high pow-
ered incentives demand high risk premia to meet their participation constraint.
Degree of aggregation in the performance measure The higher the perfor-
mance measure is aggregated, the less specific incentives work and the lower
is the optimum power of incentives.
Coordination of efforts Situations in which there are positive cross-effort ex-
ternalities with educational production favor incentives based on teacher team
work.
Teacher attitude towards risk The more risk averse teachers are, the lower is
the optimum power of incentives. Again, risk-aversion constitutes the need for a
compensation of risk-bearing, which is socially costly.
Teachermotivation With an appropriate incentive structure, preexisting teacher
motivation can be benefited from. Potential selection problems do not material-
ize due to binding participation constraints.
The analysis of teacher motivation and incentives in schools against the back-
ground of the empirical evidence tells a cautionary tale about the introduction of
incentive schemes based on merit pay. If not well designed, such programs are
likely to degrade preexistingmotivation and lead to effort substitution into areas
which are well measurable but virtually useless with respect to the very goals of
education. Since the achievement of educational goals is extremely hard to mea-
sure, the optimum power of incentives in education is bound to be lower than in
other professions.
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5 Appendix
The appendix gives the formal exposition of the models discussed in the body of
the paper and proofs to the results stated therein.
The social surplus of education is given by educational production (the nume´raire
good) minus teacher effort cost; teachers’ utility is assumed to be of the form
U (x) = − exp (−xr) (4)
where x is the teachers’ net benefit (salary minus effort cost plus possibly private
benefits from successful students) and r is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk-aversion.
5.1 Observability of Teacher Efforts
Education is produced according to
P (e,m) = πm
n
∑
i=1
αiei = π
m


α1
...
αn


′

e1
...
en

 = πmff′e
where m denotes class size, n is the number of dimensions of teacher effort, αi is
the marginal productivity of input i which is employed at quantity ei and π is a
student’s probability of non-disruption in class. On the cost side, various efforts
are allowed to interact with each other. The effort cost function writes as
C (e) =
n
∑
i=1
n
∑
j=1
eicijej =


e1
...
en


′

c11 · · · c1n
...
. . .
...
cn1 · · · cnn




e1
...
en

 = e′Γe
where Γ is assumed to be symmetric and positive definite.8 The entirety of off-
diagonal elements of Γ captures the interactions between various effort dimen-
sions. We assume that the different effort dimensions complement each other, i.e.
cij < 0∀i 6= j.
8The assumption of positive definiteness is economically justified by the requirement that effort in
any dimension be costly.
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If educational production and teacher efforts are observable, the school authority
faces the following per-student problem Π∗:
Π∗ : W∗ = max
m∈R+,e∈Rn+
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
C (e)
}
.
Exploiting the first-order conditions9 yields the optimum values of teacher effort
and class size
e∗ =
1
2
m∗πm
∗
Γ
−1ff, (5)
m∗ = −
1
2 lnπ
. (6)
Inserting the optimum values into the definition of surplus yields the maximum
attainable welfare10
W∗ =
1
2
m∗π2m
∗
α′Γ−1ff−
1
4
mπ2m
∗
ff′Γ−1ff
= −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
ff′Γ−1ff. (7)
5.2 Output-based Aggregate Signal
In the following, we consider the case that teacher effort is not observable and
that educational production is only observable via a possibly distorted and noisy
signal S (m, e) . A teachers’s pay T now consists of a base salary b and a signal-
depending part tS (m, e) , where t is the slope of the compensation schedule and
can be interpreted as the power of the applied incentive contract:
T (S (m, e)) = b + tS (m, e) .
Without direct private benefits form teaching, a teacher’s net benefit hence writes
as x = T− C. We restrict ourselves to linear transfers which are often used in the
literature, although – as Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987) show – the conditions
for such a scheme to be optimal are quite stringent. We will also use them in the
following since they allow for a simple intuitive interpretation of the results.
9Note that ∂∂x (˘
′x) = ˘ and ∂∂x (x
′
Λx) = 2Λx.
10The symbol ǫ denotes Euler’s number.
22
The signal S (m, e) is produced by a similar technology as actual performance:
S (m, e) = πm
n
∑
i=1
si (ei) = π
m
n
∑
i=1
ai (ei + ε i)
= πm


a1
...
an


′ 



e1
...
en

+


ε1
...
εn



 = πma′ (e+ ”) .
The vector of errors ” ≡ (ε1, . . . , εn)
′ is distributed N (0,Σ); the covariance ma-
trix Σ is symmetric by definition.11 Note that S (m, e) is an aggregate signal in the
sense that the various contributions of efforts to production are not disclosed in-
dividually. The school authority’s design of the incentive contracts must account
for the following constraints:
PC : E [U (b + tS (m, e)− C (e))] ≥ 0, (8)
IC : e = arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{E [U (b + tS (m, e˜)− C (e˜))]} . (9)
The participation constraint (PC) guarantees that teachers are willing to enter
the profession in the first place by assuring them a threshold utility equal to their
outside optionwhich is assumed to be equal to zero. The incentive constraint (IC)
regards the optimum reaction of teachers to the proposed contract. Following the
standard procedure, we assign the role of the mechanism designer to the school
authority as principal (cf. eg. Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo, 1997) whose
per-student problem ΠSB hence writes as
ΠSB : WSB = max
b,m∈R+,t∈R
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
(b + tS (m, e))
}
subject to (8) and (9).
Then, the fixed part of the teacher’s total salary, b, compensates for uncertainty,12
b = C (e)− tπma′e+
(
rt2π2m
/
2
)
a′Σa (10)
11The covariance matrix Σ is


σ21 · · · σ1n
.
.
.
. . .
.
.
.
σn1 · · · σ2n

 .
12Cf. Salanie´ (1994) and the discussion in footnote 4.
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and the per-student problem simplifies to
ΠSBA : W
SB
A = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
e′Γe−
rt2π2m
2m
a′Σa
}
subject to (9).
Since the teacher’s utility is monotonic in the received salary minus effort costs,
she chooses efforts so as to maximize this difference. Using (10) in (9), she solves
the problem
e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
tπma′ e˜− e˜′Γe˜
}
. (11)
The optimum effort vector can be determined by the first-order condition.13 Solv-
ing for e yields
e =
t
2
πmΓ−1a.
The reduced form of the school authority’s decision problem Π′SBA hence writes
as
Π′SBA : W
SB
A = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
t
2
π2mff′Γ−1a−
t2
4m
π2ma′Γ−1a−
rt2π2m
2m
a′Σa
}
.
The optimum second-best values of the power of incentives and class size are
derived directly from the first-order conditions and given by
tSBA = m
SB
A
ff′Γ−1a
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
, (12)
mSBA = −
1
2 lnπ
.
For a geometrical interpretation set Γ = cI, and Σ = σ2I where I is the identity
matrix, such costs for different tasks are equal and there is no interaction between
the various effort dimensions. Then, rewriting the numerator in (12)
tSBA = m
SB
A
c |ff| |a| cos θ
a′Γ−1a+2ra′σ2Ia
,
13To justify the use of the first-order approach in this setting, it suffices to show that 11 has a unique
maximizer which satisfies the first-order condition. This is the case as a′e˜ is linear in e and e˜′Γe˜ is strictly
convex in e due to the positive definiteness of Γ. We are hence maximizing a strictly concave function
on a convex set. Rogerson (1985) describes sufficient conditions for the first-order approach to be valid
in general.
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such that, when cos θ is positive,
dtSBA
d cos(θ)
< 0 :
the optimum power of incentives decreases in the
distortion of the performance measure,
dtSBA
dσ2
< 0 :
the optimum power of incentives decreases in the
noise of the performance measure,
dtSBA
dr < 0 :
the optimum power of incentives decreases in the
teacher’s risk aversion,
dtSBA
dπ > 0 :
the optimum power of incentives increases in
the probability that a student behaves well.
(13)
With an output-based performance measure, the optimum second-best effort
vector is
eSBA =
1
2
mSBA π
mSBA Γ
−1a
ff′Γ−1a
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
.
The social surplus is given by
WSBA = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
. (14)
Note that with ff = a, r = 0, and σ2i = 0 ∀i, W
SB
A = W
∗. Moreover, with Γ = cI,
and Σ = σ2I,
dWSBA
dθ
< 0,
dWSBA
dσ2
< 0,
dWSBA
dr
< 0.
Hence, asymmetric information reduces welfare due to the distortion and the
noise of the performance measure, but also due to the teacher’s risk bearing.
5.3 Input-Based Aggregate Signal
In this section, we consider the case that the signal is independent of the overall
behavior of students in class, i.e. the resulting signal is input-based, S (e) =
a′ (e+ ”) . Again, the fixed part of the teacher’s total salary, b, compensates for
uncertainty, b = C (e)− ta′e+
(
rt2
/
2
)
a′Σa. The per-student problem is then
ΠSB : WSB = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
e′Γe−
rt2
2m
a′Σa
}
subject to (9).
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The teacher chooses efforts so as to solve the problem
e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
ta′e˜− e˜′Γe˜
}
.
The maximizer can be determined by the first-order conditions (cf. footnote 13).
Solving for e yields
e =
t
2
Γ
−1a.
The reduced form of the school authority’s decision problem hence writes as
Π′SB : WSB = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
t
2
πmff′Γ−1a−
t2
4m
a′Γ−1a−
rt2
2m
a′Σa
}
.
From the first-order conditions we get again
tSB = mSBπm
SB ff′Γ−1a
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
,
mSB = −
1
2 lnπ
,
with the optimum effort vector being
eSB =
1
2
mSBπm
SB
Γ
−1a
ff′Γ−1a
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
and the social surplus is
WSB = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
= WSBA . (15)
As an alternative, consider the possibility that the input-based aggregate signal
is observable without noise, S (e) = a′e, but at a cost µC(e). Again, the fixed
part of a teacher’s total wage, b, assures that the participation constraint is met,
b = C (e)− ta′e. The per-student problem is then
ΠSBNL : W
SB
NL = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
P (e,m)−
1
m
(1+ µ) e′Γe
}
subject to (9).
The teacher chooses efforts so as to solve the problem
e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
ta′e˜− e˜′Γe˜
}
.
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The maximizer can be determined by the first-order conditions (cf. footnote 13).
Solving for e yields
e =
t
2
Γ
−1a.
The reduced form of the school authority’s decision problem hence writes as
Π′SBNL : W
SB
NL = max
m∈R+,t∈R
{
t
2
πmff′Γ−1a− (1+ µ)
t2
4m
a′Γ−1a
}
.
From the first-order conditions we get again
tSBNL =
mSBNLπ
mSBNL
1+ µ
ff′Γ−1a
a′Γ−1a
,
mSBNL = −
1
2 lnπ
and the social surplus is
WSBNL = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
(1+ µ) a′Γ−1a
. (16)
Hence, comparing (15) to (16), the use of the noiseless signal is preferred iff
µ < 2r
a′Σa
a′Γ−1a
. (17)
5.4 Disaggregate Signal
In this section we analyze the possibility of rewarding different dimensions of
effort differently by a vector t of differentiated incentive powers, t ≡ (t1, . . . , tn)
′.
This requires that individual inputs be separately measurable. Hence, we have to
rely on a disaggregate signal of the form s (m, e) ≡ (s1 (m, e1) , . . . , sn (m, en))
′ =
πm(a • (e+ ”)).14 The total transfer to teachers is thus
T (s (m, e)) = b + t′s (m, e) .
Since the input-based and output-based performance measures are equivalent,
we analyze the more intuitive output-based one in the following. The participa-
tion and incentive constraints write as
PC : E
[
U
(
b + t′s (m, e)− C (e)
)]
≥ 0, (18)
IC : e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
E
[
U
(
b + t′s (m, e˜)− C (e˜)
)]}
(19)
14The operator • denotes entrywise multiplication of matrices (Hadamard product).
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respectively. The welfare maximization problem ΠSBD becomes in analogy to
above
ΠSBD : W
SB = max
b∈R+,t∈Rn
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
(
b + t′s (m, e)
)}
subject to (18) and (19).
Again, the fixed part of the teacher’s salary, b, compensates for uncertainty, b =
C (e)−πm (t • a)′ e+
(
rπ2m
/
2
)
(t • a)′ Σ (t • a) , such that the per-student prob-
lem becomes
ΠSBD : W
SB
D = max
t∈Rn
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
e′Γe−
rπ2m
2m
(t • a)′ Σ (t • a)
}
subject to (19).
The teacher chooses efforts so as to find
e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
πm (t • a)′ e˜− e˜′Γe˜
}
.
Themaximizing effort vector e can be determined using the first-order conditions
(cf. footnote 13). Solving for e yields
e =
1
2
πmΓ−1 (t • a) .
Hence, the reduced form problem writes as
Π′SBD : W
SB
D = max
t∈Rn
{
1
2
π2mff′Γ−1 (t • a)−
1
4m
π2m (t • a)′ Γ−1 (t • a)
−
r
2m
π2m (t • a)′ Σ (t • a)
}
.
From the first-order conditions we get
tSBD • a = m
SB
D (I+ 2rΓΣ)
−1 ff, (20)
mSBD = −
1
2 lnπ
. (21)
with the optimum effort vector being
eSBD =
1
2
mSBD π
mSBD (Γ + 2rΓΣΓ)−1 ff
and overall welfare is
WSBD = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
ff′Xff (22)
28
with
X =
[
2 (Γ+2rΓΣΓ)−1 −
(
Γ+4rΓΣΓ+4r2ΓΣΓΣΓ
)−1
− 2r
(
Γ
−1 + 4rΓ+4rΓΣΓ
)−1]
.
(23)
5.5 Motivated Teachers
We model the case of motivated teachers by assuming that their net benefit x in
(4) is T (s (m, e))−C (e) + B (m, e) with B (m, e) = πmfi′e denoting the teachers’
private benefit from successful students. We further assume that a disaggregate
signal is available as in the previous section. Hence, the participation and incen-
tive constraints write as
PC : E
[
U
(
b + t′s (m, e)− C (e) + πmfi′e
)]
≥ 0, (24)
IC : e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
E
[
U
(
b + t′s (m, e˜)− C (e˜) + πmfi′e
)]}
(25)
respectively. The welfare maximization problem ΠSBD becomes in analogy to
above
ΠSBM : W
SB
M = max
b∈R,t∈Rn
{
P (m, e)−
1
m
(
b + t′s (m, e)
)}
subject to (24) and (25).
The fixed part of the teacher’s salary, b, compensates for uncertainty,
b = C (e)− πm (t • a+ fi)′ e+
rπ2m
2
(t • a+ fi)′ Σ (t • a+ fi) ,
such that the per-student problem becomes
ΠSBM : W
SB
M = max
t∈Rn
{
P (m, e) +
1
m
B (m, e)−
1
m
e′Γe−
rπ2m
2m
(t • a+ fi)′ Σ (t • a+ fi)
}
subject to (25).
The teacher chooses efforts so as to find
e ∈ arg max
e˜∈Rn+
{
πm (t • a+ fi)′ e˜− e˜′Γe˜
}
.
Themaximizing effort vector e can be determined using the first-order conditions
(cf. footnote 13). Solving for e yields
e =
1
2
πmΓ−1 (t • a+ fi) .
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Total welfare consists of the productive value of a student’s skills plus her teacher’s
private valueminus the risk premia attached to these two benefit elements. Hence,
the reduced form problem writes
Π′SBM : W
SB
M = max
t∈Rn
{
1
2
π2mff′Γ−1 (t • a+ fi)
+
1
2m
π2mfi′Γ−1 (t • a+ fi)
−
1
4m
π2m (t • a+ fi)′ Γ−1 (t • a+ fi)
−
r
2m
π2m (t • a+ fi)′ Σ (t • a+ fi)
}
.
From the first-order conditions we get
tSBM • a+ fi = m
SB
M (I+ 2rΓΣ)
−1
(
ff+
1
m
fi
)
, (26)
mSBM = −
1
2 lnπ
(27)
with the optimum effort vector being
eSBM =
1
2
mSBM π
mSBM (Γ + 2rΓΣΓ)−1
(
ff+
1
m
fi
)
and overall welfare is
WSBM = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
ff+
1
m
fi
)′
X
(
ff+
1
m
fi
)
, (28)
where X is given in (23). Recall (24) and note that since
d
dβi
E
[
U
(
b+ t′s (m, e)− C (e) + πmfi′e
)]
< 0, (29)
no teacher with a lower motivation in at least one effort dimension will accept
the proposed contract.
5.6 Team-Based Incentives
Up to now, we have studied differentiated efforts by one single teacher. In the
following, we analyze different effort dimensions exerted by different teachers.
By assumption, we allow for the two possibilities that (1) teachers are paid on
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an individual basis and hence may compete against each other and (2) they are
awarded as a team and also behave as such.15
When teachers behave as a team, the problem is equivalent with a single teacher
being assessed via one single output based performancemeasure; also the results
for optimum transfer and class size as well as welfare remain unchanged:
tSBTA = m
SB
TA
ff′Γ−1a
a′C−1a+2ra′Σa
,
mSBTA = −
1
2 lnπ
,
WSBTA = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
a′Γ−1a+2ra′Σa
.
If teachers are treated individually, they can be incentivized with different power
and their rewards are independent from each other but they don’t let their col-
leagues profit from their own effort, such that they take into account only their
own effort costs and neglect potential positive externalities. Hence, the problem
writes as above with disaggregate signals and the solution is
tSBTD • a = m
SB
D
(
I+ 2rΓΣ
)−1
ff,
mSBTD = −
1
2 lnπ
with Γ = diag (Γ) , Σ = diag (Σ)which takes into account the strict independence
of efforts. Total surplus is
WSBTD = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
ff′Xff
with X =
[
2
(
Γ+2rΓΣΓ
)−1
−
(
Γ+4rΓΣΓ+4r2ΓΣΓΣΓ
)−1
− 2r
(
Γ
−1
+ 4rΓ+4rΓΣΓ
)−1]
.
Comparing the results in the two regimes, we consider the case of risk-neutral
teachers, such that the resulting welfare measures are given by
WSBTA = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
a′Γ−1a
,
WSBTD = −
1
8 ln (π) ǫ
ff′Γ
−1
ff,
15In the second case, we assume social control among teachers, such that there is no freeriding on
other teachers’ efforts. Of course, this is an extreme assumption, but it serves the very purpose of the
argument comparing two diametrically opposed cases.
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respectively. The condition for individual merit pay being superior to group in-
centives is
WSBTA < W
SB
TD
⇔
(
a′Γ−1ff
)2
a′Γ−1aff′Γ
−1
ff
< 1. (30)
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